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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s society, crime has become exceptionally prevalent and uncontrollable 
at times.  Recent political campaigns have been filled with promises to continue the 
war on crime.  However, this reality does not permit law enforcement officials to use 
any means necessary to catch criminals.  Some limitations are needed to control the 
government’s actions.  The outrageous government conduct defense is one such 
limitation that the courts have developed.  It is possible that some government 
conduct may be found to have violated the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.1  If the government engages in conduct that is declared to be 
                                                                
1No person shall “be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
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outrageous and “shocking to the conscience,”2 dismissal of the indictment may be 
appropriate.  One problem is that some nontraditional methods of investigating crime 
currently in use have not been declared outrageous enough to warrant use of the 
defense; as a result, law enforcement officials have gotten away with some extremely 
reprehensible conduct. 
This Note analyzes law enforcement’s use of one particularly troublesome 
tactic—the use of sexual acts or romantic promises to encourage a defendant to 
participate in illegal activities or to obtain information that can be used against the 
defendant at trial.3  The use of sex as an investigative tactic should constitute one 
type of outrageous government conduct.  Perhaps more than any other tactic used in 
the law enforcement arena, the use of sex to persuade individuals to commit criminal 
acts violates our society’s beliefs about the powers of the police and the importance 
of sexual intimacy in citizens’ lives.  These types of intimate acts have serious moral 
implications and fall extremely short of the acceptable standards of police 
investigative conduct.4  The use of sex as an investigative tool leads to a violation of 
the right to privacy and exploits intimate relations and trust.  The public cannot 
tolerate the exploitation of such relations without lessening their own respect for 
their contact with others.  There must be a limit as to what the undercover 
agents/informants can usually do to deceive a defendant,5 especially with respect to 
sexual liaisons.  
The first part of this Note gives a brief history of the outrageous government 
conduct defense, including its distinction from entrapment, its origin and its lack of 
success in the courts.  Although the entrapment defense and the outrageous conduct 
defense have some similarities, they are in fact quite different.  The second section of 
this Note discusses the perception of sex and intimacy in the United States, and why 
according to this perception and the Constitution, the use of sex/intimacy is not an 
appropriate investigative tool.  Section three of this Note examines police ethics and 
demonstrates that they do not and should not include using sex or intimacy during 
investigations.  Part four analyzes federal and state sexual misconduct cases, and 
explains why the decisions reached by the courts are incorrect and immoral 
                                                                
2Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (holding that forcible entry into 
defendant’s room by law enforcement officials, and then transportation to a hospital to have 
morphine capsules removed from his stomach, was conduct that “shocks the conscience”).  
3Barry Tarlow, Column, RICO Report:  Fertile Ground for Entrapment Defense, 23 
CHAMPION 38 (1999).  Barry Tarlow is a nationally prominent criminal defense lawyer 
practicing in Los Angeles, California.  He is a frequent author and lecturer on criminal law.  
Tarlow’s column discusses how sexual misconduct by undercover agents and informants is 
becoming more frequent, though not being recognized as outrageous enough to warrant 
dismissal of an indictment.  
4Id. at 39. 
5Richard Lawrence Daniels, Note and Comment, United States v. Simpson:  
‘Outrageousness!’  What Does it Really Mean?--An Examination of the Outrageous Conduct 
Defense, 18 SW. U. L. REV. 105, 119 (1988).  This note and comment discusses the origin of 
the outrageous conduct defense and how it is different than entrapment.  Daniels also 
examines United States v. Simpson and how the use of sexual misconduct by a government 
informer should have been declared as outrageous by using the totality of circumstances 
approach.  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/10
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according to the Constitution and the views of sex and intimacy expressed in the 
United States. 
Finally, this Note concludes that the use of sexual or emotional intimacy by 
undercover agents/informants as an investigative tool is unconstitutional, outrageous 
and should be forbidden. There is no possible way to draw a line or develop a proper 
standard to apply when undercover agents use sexual conduct.  This type of conduct 
is outrageous across the board and will lead to a lack of trust in law enforcement by 
all people in society.  The solution is that this conduct should be prohibited 
altogether. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT DEFENSE 
A.  Distinguishing Entrapment from Outrageous Government Conduct 
The courts developed the outrageous government conduct defense to protect the 
due process rights guaranteed by the Constitution.6  Due process of law has been 
summarized as “a constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities 
which … are so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental, … or are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”7  If the conduct 
of law enforcement officers and informants rises to a proscribed level of 
outrageousness, these due process principles will bar the government/prosecution 
from using the judicial system,8 and hence, the indictment will be dismissed.  To 
protect the values that exist in the Constitution, the courts have developed the due 
process defense “to limit government conduct that brutalizes, abuses, or harasses, 
invades privacy, or in other ways unreasonably intrudes into people’s lives.”9  In 
order to raise a due process claim, the government activity must violate some 
protected right of the defendant,10 violate the sense of “fundamental fairness” found 
in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and “shock the universal sense of 
justice.”11  Dismissal based on outrageous conduct is reserved for only the most 
egregious circumstances, and “…is not to be invoked each time the government acts 
                                                                
6Catherine Baker Stetson, Outrageous Conduct:  A Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Defense, 5 CRIM. JUST. J. 55, 67 (1981).  This comment discusses the existence of the 
outrageous conduct defense and how it has been established and viewed by the courts.  Stetson 
also argues that there is a distinction between outrageous conduct and entrapment, and that the 
courts should be careful not to confuse them.  See also supra note 1. 
7Rochin, 342 U.S. at 169.   
8United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1973) (first recognized the possibility of 
a defense based on due process). 
9Bennett L. Gershman, Entrapment, Shocked Consciences, and the Staged Arrest, 66 
MINN. L. REV. 567, 597 (1982).  The author argues that courts who do recognize the 
outrageous conduct defense declare rulings which fail to guide subsequent courts, thus causing 
the defense to be unpredictable and inadequate.  
10Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion upholds 
recognition of the due process defense).  
11Russell, 411 U.S. at 432.  
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deceptively.”12  The defense requires more than a mere demonstration of flagrant 
police conduct.13  Additionally, whether the government’s conduct is sufficiently 
outrageous to violate due process is a question of law and unlike the entrapment 
defense, is not an issue for the jury.14 
Entrapment, a judicially created affirmative defense, is not based on any 
constitutional right.15  Entrapment occurs whenever the police plan, suggest, instigate 
or aid in the commission of a crime that would not have otherwise occurred.16  Even 
though the defendant committed the crime, the entrapment defense states that he/she 
should not be punished if the crime was instigated by the government.17  The 
entrapment defense consists of two elements:  (1) the use of persuasion, trickery, or 
fraud by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to commit a 
crime;18 and (2) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government 
rather than that of the innocent defendant.19  The entrapment defense and the 
outrageous conduct defense are frequently raised together; however, they are 
distinctly different.20 
The important question asked in entrapment cases is whether the defendant was 
predisposed to commit the crime before any government instigation.21  If the 
defendant is found to have been predisposed to commit the crime, and if the idea 
originated with the defendant, then no entrapment exists even if the government was 
involved in the commission of the offense.22  By contrast, the key inquiry that must 
                                                                
12United States v. Sneed, 34 F.3d 1570, 1577 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. 
Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 910 (10th Cir. 1992)).  
13State v. Myers, 689 P.2d 38, 41 (1984).  
14See United States v. Nunez-Rios, 622 F.2d 1093 (2nd Cir. 1980) (arguing that it is for 
the trial court and not the jury to decide whether outrageous government conduct has 
occurred); See also United States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (arguing 
that a prosecution barred on due process grounds is a legal question to be determined by the 
court, not the jury). 
15Stetson, supra note 6, at 55.  
16B. Grant Stitt & Gene G. James, Entrapment:  An Ethical Analysis, in MORAL ISSUES IN 
POLICE WORK 129, 130 (1985).  
17Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossing the Constitutional Line:  Due Process and the Law 
Enforcement Justification, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 745, 748 (1992).  Greaney discusses the 
existence of the due process defense and how the predisposition of the defendant is irrelevant.  
She then argues that law enforcement officials should be subject to the same laws as normal 
citizens, and that the means used must justify the ends.  
18See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1958).  
19Id.   
20Paul Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment Cases:  The Journey Back, 27 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 457, 458 (1990).  The author argues that the lines between the objective test 
of entrapment and the due process defense are hazy, and that the due process defense is only 
reserved for the most intolerable government conduct. 
21Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932). 
22Id. at 451. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/10
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be made in an outrageous conduct defense is whether the government’s conduct was 
outrageous and violated some due process right of the defendant.23  Therefore, 
according to the outrageous conduct defense, even if the defendant was predisposed 
to commit the crime, the indictment should be dismissed if the government conduct 
is found to be outrageous.  This inquiry focuses on an objective approach to the 
government’s conduct; whereas the entrapment inquiry focuses on a subjective 
approach or the predisposition of the defendant.24  A few state courts have criticized 
the generally accepted “subjective” test of entrapment and have adopted instead an 
“objective” test in which the court considers only the nature of the police conduct 
involved, without reference to the predisposition of the particular defendant.25  
Additionally, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted to distinguish between the 
subjective approach (predisposition) and the objective approach (government 
conduct) of entrapment.26  Hence, the subjective approach was the traditional 
entrapment approach, and the objective approach of entrapment was basically 
identical to the new outrageous conduct defense.27  Because objective entrapment 
and the outrageous conduct defense are so similar, under an objective entrapment 
theory, even a predisposed defendant cannot be convicted if the government’s 
conduct amounts to a violation of due process.  However, when defendants use this 
defense, it usually falls under the outrageous government conduct name and not 
objective entrapment. 
In 1932, the first case to recognize the entrapment defense, Sorrells v. United 
States, involved a defendant charged with violating the National Prohibition Act.28  
A prohibition agent requested liquor from the defendant three times, appealing to 
their common experiences in World War I, before the defendant acquiesced and 
obtained the alcohol for the agent.29  The Court began its analysis of the possible 
entrapment defense by stating:  “It is well settled that the fact that officers or 
employees of the Government merely afford opportunities or facilities for the 
commission of the offense does not defeat the prosecution.  Artifice and stratagem 
may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.”30  Nonetheless, the 
entrapment defense should be granted if the criminal design originates with the 
government and induces an otherwise innocent person into committing a crime 
purely to obtain a conviction.31  The Court recognized the defense of entrapment and 
                                                                
23See supra text accompanying notes 10-11.  
24Marcus, supra note 20, at 458; see also Molly K. Nichols, Note, Entrapment and Due 
Process:  How Far Is Too Far?, 58 TUL. L. REV. 1207, 1212 (1984) (discussing the 
similarities between objective entrapment and the due process defense). 
25See, e.g., People v. Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. 1990) (noting that it has been 
suggested that the “outrageous government conduct” defense is merely the objective theory of 
entrapment under a different name).   
26United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 349 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981). 
27Stetson, supra note 6, at 63; see also Jamieson, 461 N.W.2d at 890-91.  
28287 U.S. 435 (1932).  
29Id. at 439.  
30Id. at 441.  
31Id. at 442.  
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reversed the conviction, explaining that the controlling question in entrapment cases 
is “whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is 
seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity 
of its own officials.”32  The Court seems to have defined entrapment primarily in 
terms of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime (the subjective 
standard), rather than focusing on the actual conduct of the government (the 
objective standard).  Nevertheless, the language above does not actually address 
what role the government’s actions should play in deciding whether or not the 
defense of entrapment will be applicable.33  Moreover, the concurring opinion argued 
that entrapment should focus on the government’s conduct and not on the 
predisposition of the defendant.34 
Sherman v. United States, a case decided twenty-six years later, addressed the 
conflict between the subjective and objective standards of entrapment.35  In this case, 
a government informant met the defendant during rehabilitation treatments and asked 
the defendant if he could supply him with narcotics.36  The defendant refused several 
times, but eventually supplied the informant with the narcotics primarily because of 
the informant’s description of the suffering he was enduring due to his withdrawal.37  
The defendant was arrested on narcotics charges and successfully raised the defense 
of entrapment.38  The Court reasoned that the mere affording of opportunities to 
commit an offense is not entrapment, but that “Congress could not have intended that 
its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons into violations.”39  The 
conviction was reversed on the basis that the defendant was not predisposed to 
commit the crime;40 nevertheless, the concurring opinion once again argued that the 
focus of the entrapment defense should be on the conduct of the government and not 
on the defendant.41  Because of this tension between subjective and objective views 
                                                                
32Id. at 451.  
33Greaney, supra note 17, at 757.   
34Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459 (Roberts, J., concurring) (The applicable principle is that courts 
must be closed to the trial of a crime instigated by the government’s own agents.  No other 
issue, no comparison of equities as between the guilty official and the guilty defendant, has 
any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy). 
35356 U.S. 369 (1958). 
36Id. at 371.  
37Id.  
38Id. at 370.  
39Id. at 372.  
40Sherman, 356 U.S. at 373-78. 
41The Sherman concurrence stated: 
“The crucial question, not easy of answer, to which the court must direct itself is 
whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to 
which common feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power.  For 
answer it is wholly irrelevant to ask if the ‘intention’ to commit the crime originated 
with the defendant or government officers, or if the criminal conduct was the product 
of the ‘creative activity’ of law-enforcement officials.” 
Id. at 382 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/10
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of the entrapment defense, the Supreme Court would later address more cases 
concerning entrapment and what standard should be used.  
B.  Origin of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense 
The classic case first addressing due process concerns about the conduct of law 
enforcement officials was Rochin v. California in 1952.42  In Rochin, three deputy 
sheriffs forced their way into Rochin’s room and found him sitting on the side of the 
bed.43  The officers asked him about the morphine pills on his nightstand, but instead 
of responding Rochin swallowed the capsules.44  After a struggle, the officers took 
Rochin to a hospital and directed a doctor to pump his stomach to obtain the 
swallowed capsules; the pills were used as the principle evidence to convict him.45  
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction on due process grounds, rather than on 
an analysis of illegal search and seizure.46  The Court stated: “It would be a 
stultification of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast 
upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by 
force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.”47  The Court 
concluded that the way this conviction was obtained did “… more than offend some 
fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combating crime too 
energetically.  This is conduct that shocks the conscience.”48  This language of the 
Court provided the basis for which the due process defense would be recognized and 
defined in the future.   
Some years later, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Russell on 
entrapment grounds.49  However, this case first recognized and laid the groundwork 
for the future of the outrageous government conduct defense.50  In Russell, an 
undercover government agent assigned to locate a suspected methamphetamine lab 
approached Russell by offering to supply an essential and rare chemical used in the 
production of the drug.51  Russell was convicted after asserting an entrapment 
defense and argued on appeal that even though a jury could have found him 
predisposed to commit the crime, entrapment existed as a matter of law.52  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the conviction on the grounds that a government 
                                                                
42342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
43Id. at 166.  
44Id. 
45Id. 
46Id. at 174.  “This Court granted certiorari because a serious question is raised as to the 
limitations which the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes on the 
conduct of criminal proceedings by the states.”  Rochin, 342 U.S. at 168. 
47Id. at 173.  
48Id. at 172.  
49411 U.S. 423 (1973).  
50Id. at 431-32.  
51Id. at 425.   
52Id. at 427. 
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agent supplied an essential ingredient to the manufacturing of the drug.53  
Additionally, the court held that a defense to a criminal charge exists if the 
government’s participation in a criminal offense is excessive.54  
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that the defendant 
could have obtained the ingredient from another source and had done so before the 
government became involved.55  The Court decided the case on entrapment grounds 
and found that the defense was inapplicable because the defendant had been 
predisposed to commit the crime, and the government had not induced him to 
become involved.56  However, the Court did recognize the possible existence of the 
outrageous government conduct defense in dicta by stating that “We may some day 
be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is so 
outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from 
invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction.”57  Even though the focus of this 
case concentrated on the subjective approach to entrapment (predisposition of the 
defendant), the dissent noted that there existed both a subjective and objective 
approach to entrapment.58  Furthermore, the dissent argued that because of the 
inadequacies of the subjective approach, the due process defense was needed.59 
Due to the persistence of this split in analysis between the subjective and 
objective theories of entrapment, the Supreme Court addressed the issue again in 
Hampton v. United States.60  In this case, a government informant supplied drugs to 
the defendant who then sold the drugs to government agents.61  The jury rejected the 
defendant’s assertion that he did not know the substance was heroin and found him 
guilty of distribution.62  The defendant’s alternative defense of entrapment eventually 
reached the Supreme Court.  Unfortunately, the Court was unable to reach a majority 
opinion, and a three-member plurality of the Court found that predisposition renders 
both the entrapment defense and due process defense unavailable under Russell.63  
The two concurring members found that Russell did not preclude a due process 
defense when defendants were predisposed, but that Hampton did not require 
reversal based on this conclusion because the government’s conduct here was not 
overreaching.64  While the dissent agreed with the concurrence that a due process 
defense should be available to defendants based upon outrageous government 
                                                                
53Id. 
54Russell, 411 U.S. at 431.  
55Id.   
56Id. at 433. 
57Id. at 431-32.  
58Id. at 440-43 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
59Russell, 411 U.S. at 440-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
60425 U.S. 484 (1976).  
61Id. at 485.  
62Id. at 487.  
63Id. at 488-90 (opinion of Rehnquist, J., with Burger, C.J., & White, J.).  
64Id. at 492-95 (Powell & Blackmun, JJ., concurring).  
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/10
2000] SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND THE GOVERNMENT 801 
conduct, they disagreed with both the plurality and the concurrence that entrapment 
should be defined in terms of predisposition instead of the nature of the 
government’s conduct.65  In summation, a total of five members of the Court held 
that a defense based on the due process clause, though not relevant here, had not 
been overruled by the Court’s holding in Russell and still permitted predisposed 
defendants to take advantage of the defense.66  Although this decision seemed like a 
positive one for defendants, the courts continued to look harshly on the use of the 
defense.  
C.  The Lack of Success of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense 
The status of the law has remained the same.67  Most courts continue to reject a 
defense of outrageous government conduct.  The Supreme Court has left the door 
open for the defense of outrageous government conduct; however, it has never been 
presented with facts that support it.68  Most lower federal courts and state courts 
recognize the defense.69  Nonetheless, one circuit has chosen to reject any possibility 
of the defense.70  The defense is raised frequently, yet rarely successfully.71  One of 
the main reasons for the lack of success of this defense is that the Supreme Court has 
never provided any concrete guidelines on which to define outrageous government 
conduct.72  Concepts such as “fundamental fairness” and “universal sense of justice” 
are difficult to measure; thus, “[n]o federal court has defined with any sort of 
precision the contours of the outrageous conduct defense.”73  Although Justice 
Frankfurter proceeded to suggest in Sherman v. United States74 that appeals to 
“sympathy, friendship and the possibility of exorbitant gain” cannot be tolerated,75 he 
                                                                
65Hampton, 425 U.S. at 496-47 (Brennan, Stewart, & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).   
66Dana M. Todd, Note, In Defense of the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense in the 
Federal Courts, 84 KY. L.J. 415, 430 (1995/1996) [hereinafter Todd] (discussing the origin of 
the outrageous conduct defense, how the different courts have viewed the defense, and certain 
types of conduct that defendants argue should warrant dismissal of their indictment, but are 
unsuccessful in the courts) (citing PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 277-78 (1989). 
67Todd, supra note 66, at 430. 
68Id. 
69Id. 
70United States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that the defense could not 
prevail for three reasons:  Hampton effectively overruled the dictum in Russell; the court 
lacked the authority to exercise its supervisory powers where no independent constitutional 
right was violated; and there were constitutional separation of powers concerns).  
71Todd, supra note 66, at 430 (Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, What Conduct of Federal Law 
Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-operating in Criminal Offense Raises Due Process 
Defense Distinct from Entrapment, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 273, 285 (1990)).  Id. 
72United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1435 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated sub nom, United 
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986) (outrageous conduct cannot be defined by 
set standards). 
73Id. 
74356 U.S. 369 (1958).  
75Id. at 383 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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concluded that “[w]hat police conduct is to be condemned … must be picked out 
from case to case as new situations arise involving different crimes and new methods 
of detection.”76  Instead of defining outrageous conduct and then analyzing the facts 
of the cases according to the definition, “the courts characteristically recite a litany 
of facts and then cast their votes against the defendant.”77  This method lacks any 
type of analytical structure, and it is influenced by social and political pressures that 
are continuously changing because of the “inherent flux in socio-political norms.”78  
The lack of applicable judicial standards has caused the defense to rarely be 
successful as lower courts have no guidance to follow in making their decisions.  As 
a result, a plethora of lower court decisions have been produced that lack any type of 
sound judicial analysis whatsoever. 
Because the Supreme Court has never approved a defense based on due process 
violations resulting from outrageous government conduct, the lower federal courts 
have been extremely sparing in their approval of the defense.79  The defense has been 
raised in a multitude of offenses involving drugs;80 bribery;81 mail and wire fraud;82 
escape from prison;83 bootlegging;84 child pornography;85 credit card fraud;86 
counterfeiting;87 sale, possession, transportation, or exportation of explosives or 
firearms;88 food stamp fraud;89 theft, burglary and conversion;90 fish and game 
violations;91 extortion;92 criminal contempt;93 illegal transportation of aliens;94 and 
                                                                
76Id. at 384.  
77Greaney, supra note 17, at 773.  
78Id.  
79Todd, supra note 66, at 432.  
80See, e.g., United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978).  
81See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1984).  
82See, e.g., United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1984).  
83See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 791 F.2d 1383 (9th Cir. 1986).  
84See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).  
85See, e.g., United States v. Boffardi, 684 F. Supp. 1263 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  
86See, e.g., United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091 (2d Cir. 1985).  
87See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 540 F.2d 1152 (1st Cir. 1976).  
88See, e.g., United States v. Caron, 615 F.2d 920 (1st Cir. 1980).  
89See, e.g., United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1982).   
90See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 635 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir. 1980). 
91See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425 (3d Cir. 1986).  
92See, e.g., United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561 (11th Cir. 1984).  
93See, e.g., United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 
1052 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 780 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Young 
v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).  
94See, e.g., United States v. Valdóvinos, 588 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Cal.), rev’d on other 
grounds, 743 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir. 1984).  
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arson.95  However, only two circuits have reversed convictions based on the 
outrageous government conduct defense.  The Ninth Circuit in Greene v. United 
States96 addressed the issue of outrageous government conduct as a defense and 
found it to be successful.  In Greene, a government agent pressured the defendants 
into re-establishing their bootlegging operation.97  The agent was involved in the 
operation for over a two-year period and was the defendants’ only customer in their 
operation.98  The defendants were convicted of conspiracy, possession of an unlawful 
still, and unlawful sale of distilled spirits.99  The Court looked at the totality of the 
circumstances and decided that the government’s conduct had reached a level of 
outrageousness that warranted reversal of the conviction.100  The court reasoned that 
although this case was not the typical entrapment case, “the same underlying 
objections which render entrapment repugnant to American criminal justice are 
operative.”101  Additionally, the court stated that the conduct of the government rose 
to a level of “creative activity” that was more intense and aggressive than the activity 
found against the government in numerous entrapment cases that it had examined.102 
The Third Circuit in United States v. Twigg103 also addressed the due process 
issue.  In Twigg, a government informant contacted one of the defendants to set up 
an illegal drug laboratory for which he provided the equipment, materials and site 
needed to manufacture speed.104  The informant also proceeded to produce the drug 
with minimal assistance from the defendants.105  The court analyzed the permissible 
range of government conduct by noting that while infiltration of criminal operations 
via undercover agents and informants is acceptable, the tactics used in this case were 
not.106  The court stated that “[u]nlike other cases rejecting this defense, the police 
investigation here was not concerned with an existing laboratory; the illicit plan did 
not originate with the criminal defendants; and neither of the defendants were 
chemists, an indispensable requisite to this criminal enterprise.”107  The court 
concluded that the governmental involvement in the criminal activities of this case 
                                                                
95See, e.g., United States v. Beverly, 723 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1983).  
96454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971).  
97Id. at 787.  
98Id. at 785, 786.  
99Id. at 783.  
100Id. at 787.  
101Greene, 454 F.2d at 787.  
102Id.  
103588 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1978).  
104Id. at 375-76.   
105Id.  Twigg’s actions were at the specific direction of the government’s informant, and 
“Twigg contributed nothing in terms of expertise, money, supplies, or ideas.”  Id. at 382. 
106Id. at 380.  
107Twigg, 588 F.2d at 381 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted).  
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had reached “… a demonstrable level of outrageousness and mandated reversal of 
the conviction.”108  
Other than Twigg and Greene, very few cases exist in which the outrageous 
government conduct claim has prevailed.109  Some courts have attempted to develop 
factors or compile lists of what type of government conduct has been proven 
acceptable.110  Examples of acceptable behavior that have been listed include:  using 
“artifice and stratagem” to combat crime;111 using paid informants;112 supplying 
contraband to defendants to gain their confidence;113 providing necessary and 
valuable items to help further a conspiracy already in existence;114 infiltrating a 
criminal organization;115 and approaching those already engaged in or contemplating 
criminal actions.116  The listing of unacceptable behavior, however, proved to be 
more difficult.  The court in United States v. Bogart defined these activities as the 
use of “unwarranted physical, or perhaps mental, coercion.”117  But then the question 
of what actually constitutes physical and mental coercion must be asked.  Drawing 
lines between acceptable and unacceptable police conduct may seem helpful, 
although ultimately every case must be decided on its own facts.118  Additionally, 
“haziness surrounding the type of conduct that will not be tolerated leaves the due 
process defense open to the possibility that its parameters will be determined by the 
fears and concerns of society at the time the defense is raised, rather than by the 
                                                                
108Id. 
109See, e.g., United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3rd Cir. 1975) (holding a “full circle” 
narcotics sting intolerable and reversing the defendant’s conviction, but failing to label the 
rationale as one based on due process); United States v. Gardner, 658 F. Supp. 1573 (W.D. Pa. 
1987) (dismissing an indictment on due process grounds where an undercover agent persuaded 
a non-predisposed, fellow postal worker to obtain cocaine by using their friendship and 
repeatedly asking for the favor); United States v. Valdóvinos, 588 F. Supp. 551 (N.D. Cal. 
1984) (holding INS service recruiting Mexican nationals in Mexico to enter U.S. illegally 
outrageous); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F. Supp. 744 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (dismissing 
the indictment because of government over-involvement in drug operation); People v. 
Isaacson, 378 N.E.2d 78 (N.Y. 1978) (holding police overreaching outrageous).   
110See, e.g., United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986) (where defendant 
claimed that a government informant had coaxed him to accept narcotics as payment for 
posters, the court remanded the case back for findings of fact on the nature of and motivation 
for the government’s conduct). 
111Id. at 1438 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932)).  
112Id. (referencing United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1378 (9th Cir. 1980)).  
113Id. (referencing United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432 (1973)).  
114Id. (referencing United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1983)).  
115Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438 (referencing United States v. Marcello, 731 F.2d 1354, 1357 
(9th Cir. 1984)).  
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boundaries of the Constitution.”119  This lack of a concrete standard has 
compromised the viability of the defense because courts have no guidance or specific 
standards to look to when deciding cases that involve overreaching government 
conduct.  Moreover, a concrete standard is needed to show that the use of sexual acts 
and romantic intimacy by the government as a type of investigative tool is 
unacceptable and outside the boundaries of the Constitution because it violates 
fundamental due process and privacy rights of the defendant.  Additionally, it 
involves government acts that fall short of the acceptable standards of police 
investigative conduct.    
III.  THE CULTURE/NORMS OF SEX AND INTIMACY IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
Sexual misconduct/romantic intimacy is an investigative method that law 
enforcement officials have recently been using that contains serious moral and 
constitutional implications.  This type of conduct rarely meets the stringent 
requirements needed for dismissal based upon outrageous governmental conduct,120 
although defendants make a strong case that “… legitimate undercover operations 
can be conducted without federal agents acting like modern day Mata Haris.”121  
Before exploring the federal and state cases dealing with sexual misconduct, it is 
wise to examine how the United States views sex and intimacy.  According to 
popular, public views, sex and intimacy should not be used by law enforcement 
officials in investigating crime today.  Police ethics do not condone these relatively 
new methods for combating crime, which may lead to negative results in society.  
A.  Sex, Intimacy, and Morality 
Human beings are sexual beings, with sex being one of the motivating forces in 
their lives.122  “Sexual experience is for human beings, … a profoundly personal, 
spontaneous, and absorbing experience in which they express intimate fantasies and 
vulnerabilities which typically cannot brook the sense of an external, critical 
observer.”123  Humans use sexuality for many different purposes―to express 
intimacy or love, for recreation or for procreation.124  No one purpose constantly 
dominates.  Instead, human self-control chooses among the purposes depending on 
the context of the situation and the type of person involved.125  Intimacy is a major 
                                                                
119Greaney, supra note 17, at 778-79. 
120Tarlow, supra note 3, at 38.  
121United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 1991).  Mata Hari was the stage 
name adopted by Margaretha Zell, a dark and beautiful Dutch woman born in 1876.  She 
became an exotic dancer and then a World War I spy for the Germans.  Her spying began 
through a series of wealthy lovers.  Experience the Internet’s Most Powerful Search Agent:  
Name and Logo, Who was Mata Hari?, at http://www.thewebtools.com/aboot/namelogo.htm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2001). 
122LEONARD V. RAMER, YOUR SEXUAL BILL OF RIGHTS:  AN ANALYSIS OF THE HARMFUL 
EFFECTS OF SEXUAL PROHIBITIONS 13 (1973).   
123THOMAS C. GREY, THE LEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY 75-76 (1983).  
124Id. at 76.  
125Id.  
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part of sex and relationships between human beings.  Intimacy often “… involves 
bringing another person within one’s soul or being, not for any independently 
personal or instrumental objective, but for the sake of the other person or for the sake 
of the bond and attachment between the persons.”126  No other kind of relationship 
touches so centrally the core of one’s being, and nothing else constitutes such an 
important resource for dealing with the problems of the world.127 
“Vulnerability” and “unenforceable trust” exist in intimate relationships and is 
not evident in other types of social or business relationships.128  One court has 
remarked that “[i]t should be common knowledge that sex involves physical and 
psychological desires so strong as to readily foster fantasies and to anesthetize or 
supplant normal rational reasoning and will.”129  Exploitation of this physical desire 
and trust is both harmful and degrading to the person involved, as well as to all 
persons who have respect for intimate relationships.130  Additionally, “like our 
ancestors in the Garden of Eden, no one is completely impervious to seductive 
temptations.”131  It certainly may be true that not every person in society has his/her 
price or can be tempted.  Yet certain investigative conduct (mostly sexual) does 
prove able to produce offenses a good portion of the time.132  This type of conduct is 
“deeply subversive of the possibility of friendship, love, and trust,”133 and its use in 
law enforcement is “morally equivalent to the decision to use violence; indeed it is a 
kind of torture.”134 
“Intimate relationships involve potential transformations of moral duties.”135  In 
morals, as in daily life, knowing certain features of a situation is pertinent to one’s 
act being regarded as voluntary.136  Having control over what certain persons know 
                                                                
126Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy and Police Undercover Work, in MORAL ISSUES IN 




129State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *3 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. 
App. Aug. 28, 1986) (where government informer used kissing and romantic teasing to 
convince defendant to buy drugs).  
130Schoeman, supra note 126, at 156.  
131Bennett L. Gershman, Toward a Common Law for Undercover Investigations―a Book 
Review of ABSCAM Ethics:  Moral Issues and Deception in Law Enforcement, 52 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 166, 168 (1983).  
132Gary T. Marx, Who Really Gets Stung?  Some Issues Raised By The New Police 
Undercover Work, in ABSCAM ETHICS:  MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
65, 74 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., The Police Foundation 1983).  
133Sanford Levinson, Under Cover:  The Hidden Costs of Infiltration, in ABSCAM ETHICS:  
MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 43, 50 (Gerald M. Caplan ed., The 
Police Foundation 1983).   
134Id. at 50-51.  
135Schoeman, supra note 126, at 156.  
136Id.   
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or learn about us is vital to our lives and the relationships we form.137  Similarly, a 
person has an interest in “… knowing all relevant characteristics of those with whom 
he forms any personal relationships and of those to whom he discloses information 
concerning relationships with others.”138  People need to assume a level of good faith 
as being present in the relationship or encounter.139  Additionally, people are entitled 
to the belief that those who present themselves will not be wishing harm or using the 
situation as a means of furthering their “malevolence.”140  Although “American law 
is generally unconcerned with protecting intimate relationships, it does recognize the 
existence of legal privileges that seek to protect the intimacy of certain relationships 
by barring autonomous choices to betray specific confidences.”141  To the extent that 
people are unable to trust normal appearances, “social disorder is created,” and 
morality is disturbed.142 
The term “moral” has been interpreted broadly.  Morality has been associated 
with such things as sexual conduct, honesty, truthfulness and religion.143  Morality 
has always implied a higher and nobler level of behavior.144  In addition, many 
diverse types of behavior have been evaluated according to moral standards.145  
Litigating morality is not a recent occurrence.  “Americans have inherited from the 
English legal culture an extensive record of litigation of moral issues.”146  “The legal 
process that has documented this litigation includes numerous elements that have 
individually and collectively influenced the course of moral disputes.”147  The right 
to privacy goes hand in hand with the concept of litigating morality.  Privacy 
becomes essential for sexual conduct and other intimate relations.  By examining the 
roots of the constitutional right to privacy and how morality relates to this right, it 
becomes evident that abuse of these privacy rights through sexual investigative tools 
used by law enforcement officials disturbs morality and violates these rights. 
                                                                
137Id. 
138Levinson, supra note 133, at 57.  
139Id.  
140Id. at 57-58.  
141Gershman, supra note 131, at 173.  
142Id.  
143WAYNE C. BARTEE & ALICE FLEETWOOD BARTEE, LITIGATING MORALITY:  AMERICAN 
LEGAL THOUGHT AND ITS ENGLISH ROOTS xi (1992).   
144Id.  
145Id  
146Id. at xi-xii.  Litigation of moral issues includes abortion, marriage, sodomy, 
pornography, and contraception.  Id. 
147BARTEE & BARTEE, supra note 143, at xi-xii.  Among these elements are written laws 
(statutory and constitutional) which have recorded past moral choices; judges and juries who 
apply and interpret the laws and precedents; and the legal scholars and attorneys who have the 
job of explaining and defending moral choices.  Id.   
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B.  Constitutional Implications 
The constitutional right to privacy was developed in Griswold v. Connecticut.148  
The Court based its conclusion of a right to privacy on a number of constitutional 
provisions that could be violated by governmental intrusion into people’s lives.149  
The most common of these constitutional provisions are the due process clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the Fourth Amendment Search and 
Seizure Clause.150  The most dramatic extension of the constitutional right to privacy 
came in 1973 when the Court struck down a number of restrictive abortion laws in 
several states.151  These privacy rights used in the abortion cases are often viewed as 
or reduced to liberty rights.152  Even if this view is not accepted, a strong connection 
or bond exists between the two sets of rights.153  It is the norm or standard of 
individuality and personal autonomy that provides the reason for liberty, the 
recognition of a domain of self-regarding conduct, and a sphere of privacy of 
personal information and knowledge that should remain within a person’s control.154  
Additionally, the gaining of this knowledge by unauthorized persons is usually 
considered a serious breach.155 
The demand for privacy is founded on the need for moral space, that is “… for 
conditions under which we can be, and can feel ourselves to be, acting authentically 
and independently.”156  Moral space is needed for the development and maintenance 
of individuality, and liberty is one condition for ensuring moral space.157  However, 
not all relationships exhibit moral space.  If no relationship of mutual intimacy 
exists, moral space can be secured only if privacy is respected.158  Business 
relationships, for example, do not commonly exhibit moral space; therefore, privacy 
needs to be respected in order for a person to feel as if he/she is acting 
independently. 
                                                                
148381 U.S. 479 (1965) (declaring unconstitutional a Connecticut statute that prohibited to 
married couples as to others the use of contraceptives).  
149GREY, supra note 123, at 7.  
150See supra note 1; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (No state shall “deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law …”); see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).  
151Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
152JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 190 (1996). 
153Id.  
154Id. at 191.  Information such as one’s sex life, medical history, and financial status is 
usually considered private.  Id.  
155Id. at 191. 
156KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 192.  
157Id. at 192.  
158Id.  That is, only if one is permitted to have control over one’s self-preservation.  Id.  
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Due process becomes intertwined with privacy and liberty rights.  Every citizen 
must be afforded due process of law, that is, “… a discrete concept which subsists as 
an independent guaranty of liberty and procedural fairness …”159  Due process has 
not been reduced to any formula; it represents the balance which our country has 
struck between respect for the liberty of individuals and the demands of organized 
society.160  This liberty is a “rational continuum” which includes freedom from 
arbitrary and purposeless restraints, and which recognizes that a reasonable judgment 
requires careful scrutiny of state and individual needs.161  Deprivations of liberty are 
textually illegal unless accompanied by due process of law.162  Privacy and liberty 
rights seem to involve a trend of the government respecting people’s private lives.  
The problem becomes the distinction between what is public and what is private.  
When law enforcement officials use investigative methods that amount to 
deprivations of liberty and privacy rights, the government has stepped out of the 
public sphere and into the private one.  The Constitution has been violated when the 
government engages in sexual conduct that is reserved for only the private sphere 
and hence, these methods should be forbidden.  The exploitation of trust and intimate 
relations is harmful and degrading to not only the person involved, but also to all 
persons who have respect for intimate and personal relationships.  By examining the 
history and boundaries of police ethics and behavior, it should be relatively easy to 
conclude that the use of sexual conduct and romantic intimacy by law enforcement 
officials is unjustifiable and unconstitutional. 
IV.  POLICE ETHICS/MORALS DURING INVESTIGATIONS 
Society’s treatment of those people who fail to conform to its chosen standards of 
behavior has raised moral questions.  These moral questions are not just concerned 
with rules and principles, but also with virtues, character, reasons and attitudes.163  
The due process clause “… is a dominant constitutional force to protect the moral 
values related to undercover police work, particularly the freedom and integrity of 
the individual’s will from governmental intrusion and deception.”164  Police activity 
must be regulated by more than the law--it must respect the most deeply held moral 
values of the community.165  Laws can be amended quickly; however, “public 
                                                                
159Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (earlier Connecticut 
birth control case).  
160Id.   
161Id. at 543.   
162Donald A. Dripps, At the Borders of the Fourth Amendment:  Why a Real Due Process 
Test Should Replace the Outrageous Government Conduct Defense, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 261, 
278 (1993) (arguing that police tactics need to be regulated, and the use of reasonable 
suspicion as a safeguard for all invasions of liberty is the solution). 
163KLEINIG, supra note 152 at 7.  
164Gershman, supra note 131, at 184.  “As such, the due process clause mirrors the 
equitable principle that courts will not tolerate governmental oppression, particularly 
oppression that seeks to undermine an individual’s free will.”  Id.  
165Schoeman, supra note 126, at 158. 
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notions of respect for persons and their privacy is less subject to fluctuations.”166  
Government cannot ignore what is so important to human beings.  People need to be 
involved in trusting and intimate relationships and when respect for these types of 
relationships is abandoned, the worth of the social order is severely diminished.167  
The use of sex as an investigative tool violates this trust and preys on the respect that 
people have for intimate relationships.  Without the trust and privacy needed in 
intimate affairs, social order is disturbed and people begin to think and act 
differently.  Codes of ethics have been developed to combat the abuse of government 
power.  
A.  Codes of Ethics 
Professionals are usually governed by a “code of ethics.”  Law enforcement 
officials are no different.  A professional code is a sign of an occupation’s true 
professionalization.168  The code comprises a public set of constraints under which 
the members promise to operate, and it is intended to provide “a tangible basis for 
public trust.”169  These codes are for the benefit of the public, as well as the 
professional.  They act not only as a guarantee to those who use professional services 
that certain standards will be observed, but when violated, they may jeopardize the 
standing of certain recognized members of a particular profession.170 
Police organizations have always promulgated codes of ethics.  The first code for 
United States police was developed in 1928.171  The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
published its FBI Pledge for Law Enforcement Officers in 1937.172  Then in 1956, a 
code of ethics prepared by the Police Officer’s Research Association of California 
was adopted by the National Conference of Police Associations, and in 1957 it was 
adopted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.173  This Law 
Enforcement Code of Ethics (with changes made to it in 1991) is still used today.174  
                                                                
166Id.  
167Id.  
168KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 33.  
169Id.  
170Id. 
171Id. at 235.  The history of the 1928 code is interesting.  On the recommendation of an 
architect of the professionalization movement in American policing, August Vollmer, a young 
protégé, O. W. Wilson, was appointed as Chief of the Wichita Police Department.  This young 
protégé put into practice what he had learned from his mentor and wrote a code that assured 
the citizens that the police department was now there for them.  Additionally, he rewrote the 
department’s manual stressing strict lines of authority, clear and efficient procedures, and rigid 
standards of conduct.  Id. 
172KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 235.  Printed in the December 1937 issue of the FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin, the director introduced the Pledge as being for the “voluntary 
consideration, acceptance, execution and adherence by all law enforcement officers.”  Id.  
Police departments would get their employees to sign and forward the pledges to the FBI, 
which then used the Bulletin to update the readers about its adoption throughout the United 
States.  Id.  
173Id. at 235. 
174Id. at 236.   
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Law enforcement officers promise to serve mankind; guard the lives and property of 
all people; protect the innocent against deception and the weak against oppression; 
respect the Constitutional rights of all people; keep private and public life separate; 
etc.175  A code of ethics should set standards beyond ordinary morality if it is to 
operate as an effective code of ethics.176  Similarly, something more must be 
demanded of those to whom the code of ethics applies; yet, if a code is to be realized 
in practice, it cannot ask more than most of those people subject to it are willing to 
give.177  However, it has been argued that police ethics may be the exception―that 
police are only subject to the ethical and moral standards of normal people.178  The 
reason for this discrepancy may be due to the kind of work in which police are 
engaged.  Likewise, “[b]ecause some police work seems to be inherently corrupting, 
police departments need to be more careful than they are about the work they do.”179  
                                                                
175KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 236.  The complete Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, 
including the 1991 changes to the italicized parts noted in brackets, is as follows: 
As a Law Enforcement Officer, my fundamental duty is to serve mankind [the 
community]; to safeguard the lives and property; to protect the innocent against 
deception, the weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against 
violence or disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all men [ ] to liberty, 
equality and justice. 
I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; [, and will behave in a 
manner that does not bring discredit to me or my agency.  I will] maintain courageous 
calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be constantly 
mindful of the welfare of others.  Honest in thought and deed, in both my personal and 
official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land [ ] and the regulations 
of my department.  Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or that is confided 
to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless revelation is necessary in 
the performance of my duty.  
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, [political beliefs, or 
aspirations,] animosities or friendships to influence my decisions.  With no 
compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce the 
law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, never 
employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities. 
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a 
public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the law enforcement [police] 
service.  [I will never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor will I condone such 
acts by other police officers.  I will cooperate with all legally recognized agencies and 
their representatives in the pursuit of justice. 
I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard of professional performance 
and I will take every reasonable opportunity to enhance and improve my level of 
knowledge and competence.] I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and 
ideals, dedicating myself before God to my chosen profession…law enforcement. 
Id. at 236-37.  
176Michael Davis, Do Cops Really Need a Code of Ethics, 10, 2 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 20 
(1991). 
177KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 240.  See also Davis, supra note 171, at 20.  
178KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 240.  
179Davis, supra note 176, at 25.  
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For example, police may need to work fewer and less irregular hours and become 
involved in less undercover work than they are currently.  Nevertheless, the use of 
certain investigative methods by law enforcement officials do not conform to a code 
of ethics, are not fit to be engaged in by a normal person, and can be corrected 
through the use of the outrageous government conduct defense. 
B.  Use of Deception in Undercover Investigative Techniques 
The Constitution and codes of ethics are imperfect.  They do not “forbid every 
political evil under the sun.”180  However, in the struggle between law enforcers and 
the criminal world the use of guile and clever tactics is within reason.181  Even the 
use of some deception is acceptable to combat those criminals using the same type of 
trickery when committing offenses.182  Included in this practice of deception is the 
use of undercover agents and government informants.  The use of these two types of 
investigators is not per se unlawful,183 but there is certainly a limit to allowing 
governmental involvement in criminal acts. Undercover agents should not be 
allowed to do by secrecy what they are not permitted by the Constitution to do 
openly.184  Hence, law enforcement officials cannot violate a person’s due process 
and privacy rights because the Constitution forbids this type of violation. 
Prior to 1977, undercover techniques were used infrequently and only in certain 
circumstances.185  Today the range of criminal activities under investigation by this 
technique is broad, and the costs for such techniques have become astronomical.186  
Nevertheless, the “allure and power” of undercover tactics makes them irresistible.187  
To some people the use of questionable or deceptively bad undercover means is 
justified because the means serve just ends.188 After all, undercover agents are 
detecting crimes, and in today’s world crime seems to be overtaking our society.  
The strong social and political mandate for combating criminal activity provides a 
strong disincentive for a judge to hold that a defendant, who has been proven guilty, 
be set free because of a police tactic used to obtain the conviction.189  But what if the 
bad means do not obtain good ends?  What if civil liberties are compromised because 
of deceptive law enforcement techniques?   
                                                                
180Dripps, supra note 162, at 264.  Cf.  Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 33 (1981).  
181Greaney, supra note 17, at 771.  
182KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 133.  See also Schoeman, supra note 126, at 147.  
183Greaney, supra note 17, at 789.  
184Schoeman, supra note 126, at 147.  
185SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE 
JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 
REPORT ON FBI UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS 1 (Comm. Print 1984).  
186Id.  For example, in 1977 the budget was $1 million, and by 1984 the budget had grown 
to a total of over $12 million.  Id.   
187Marx, supra note 132, at 92. 
188Id. 
189Greaney, supra note17, at 746.  
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Investigative methods that amount to deprivations of life, liberty, property and 
privacy violate the Constitution unless accompanied by due process and sufficient 
justification.190  The investigative method of establishing a phony sexual or 
emotionally intimate relationship with the defendant violates fundamental due 
process and privacy rights.  In distinguishing between which tactics are justifiable it 
is the “… human significance of the activity that demarcates the permissible from the 
impermissible.”191  Central to any standard of public morality is the acceptance of 
limitations on what can and cannot be done; this statement is true even when the 
intention and expectation of a greater good or the prevention of an evil is evident.192  
No matter what the greater good may be, “sex is much too strong and effective an 
inducement to be used as bait” to catch even predisposed defendants.193  An offense 
is no less criminal when it is committed in response to temptation than if it is 
committed without any sort of temptation.  Instead, the questions raised are whether 
the technique was fair and what assumptions the tactic was based on when used.194 
The use of sex as an investigative tool leads to a violation of the right to privacy 
and exploits intimate relations and trust.  This lack of trust leads to suspicions in 
everyday dealings with other people.195  The use of too much deception and disguise 
in such private areas cause even innocent people to fail to rely on their surroundings.  
It changes how these innocent people think and act.  The trust betrayed in these types 
of phony sexual relationships “falls too harshly on mankind’s capacity for forming 
important relationships.”196  The public cannot tolerate the exploitation of such 
relations without at the same time devaluing their own respect for their connections 
with others.197  The undercover use of sex denies the individual the “… right to be 
left alone―the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
man.”198  The only possible result is a decline in social order that is brought about by 
the exploitation of “… the cognitive and behavioral aspects of intimate relations by 
using them for purposes beyond the relationship itself.”199  Intimate relations involve 
                                                                
190Dripps, supra note 162, at 278.  “In the context of police practices, that means 
supported by a reasonable connection with the effort to prevent criminal activity or punish it 
through the regular course of adjudication.”  Id. at 278-79. 
191Schoeman, supra note 126, at 157. 
192Id.  
193State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 
28, 1986).  
194Marx, supra note 132, at 73.    
195KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 137.  “To say that only those tempted to do wrong would 
have anything to fear underestimates the possibilities for, and evidence of, mistake and abuse 
in this area.”  Id.  
196Schoeman, supra note 126, at 160.    
197Id. 
198Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
199Gary T. Marx, Under-the-Covers Undercover Investigations:  Some Reflections on the 
State’s Use of Sex and Deception in Law Enforcement, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 13 (1992).  
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trust that eventually leads to the exchange of confidences.200  As a result, “[a]nything 
that debases that trust must be viewed as undesirable.”201   
Law enforcement officers enjoy wide latitude and flexibility in their use of 
techniques.  There simply exists no real check on the discretion held by law 
enforcement agents and their informants,202 and the use of manipulation and deceit to 
investigate is largely unfettered by judicial control.203  The due process/outrageous 
government conduct defense does create outer limits on appropriate law enforcement 
techniques if it is used correctly.204  The defense should not be cast aside merely 
because it presents some analytical problems.205  Sexual misconduct by law 
enforcement officials and their agents falls outside any sort of law enforcement 
justification.206  In determining the point at which government agents lose the law 
enforcement justification, the point at which the due process defense should be used 
is simultaneously discovered.207  The “moral shabbiness” of this form of police 
deception is so threatening to a social self-image that we should be willing to endure 
a higher level of the criminal activity in question.208 
Zeal in tracking down crime is not always wrong; but experience has taught us 
that safeguards must be provided against the dangers of over-zealous law 
enforcement.209  Government should not be allowed to increase the risks associated 
with ordinary social relationships.210  The government is unable to search or invade a 
person’s private home without a judicial warrant.  Why should the government be 
allowed to invade a person’s body without that person being fully informed of the 
                                                                
200Id.  
201Id.  
202Todd, supra note 66, at 442.  See also Gershman, supra note 131, at 169.  
203Gershman, supra note 131, at 169.  See also Todd, supra note 66, at 442.  
204Greaney, supra note 17, at 781.  See also Marcus, supra note 20, at 465.  Marcus argues 
that there will be fact situations where reasonable people could agree that the law enforcement 
behavior was utterly outrageous.  Id.  
205Greaney, supra note 17, at 781.   
206Id. at 782.  The law enforcement justification is a subset of the larger defense of 
justification.  The Model Penal Code states: 
(1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to 
himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: 
(a) the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and 
(b) neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or 
defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and 
(c) a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise 
plainly appear. 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (Official Draft 1962).  
207Greaney, supra note 17, at 782. 
208KLEINING, supra note 152, at 137.  
209Gershman, supra note 131, at 184.  
210Id.  
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circumstances?  Is the use of sex even so different than the use of unwarranted 
physical or mental coercion?211  The argument can be made that sex is a type of 
physical or mental coercion.  When law enforcement agencies and their confidential 
informants utilize sex as an investigative tool, “… there is no way for the courts or 
anyone else to determine whether such inducement served only to uncover an 
existing propensity or created a new one.”212  Regardless of the defendant’s 
predisposition to commit the offense, the use of sex falls extremely short of an 
acceptable standard of police conduct, and it is repugnant to use such tactics to lure 
any person into crime.  Nevertheless, federal and state courts have almost always 
failed to declare this type of conduct outrageous. 
V.  AN ANALYSIS OF CASES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
Limited law exists on the government’s use of sex in criminal investigations.  
Because no definite standard is available as to what constitutes outrageous 
government conduct, courts have been reluctant to dismiss indictments based on a 
few isolated episodes of sexual activity by the undercover agent or informant during 
the investigative process.  According to a review of the limited existing law, it is 
somewhat clear that defendants who succumbed to the government’s sexual 
inducements were allowed to present entrapment defenses and obtain an entrapment 
jury charge.213  However, because many of these defendants have also been 
predisposed to commit the crimes, the entrapment defense is almost always 
unsuccessful.  The proper defense in these types of situations should be the 
outrageous government conduct defense because predisposition of the defendant is 
not required.  The use of sex by a government agent/informant definitely “shocks the 
conscience,”214 and deprives the defendant of fundamental due process and privacy 
rights which is the basis for the outrageous conduct defense.215  
A.  Federal Cases 
The use of government informants has become a popular tactic in combating 
crime today.  The government seeks out an informant, usually someone the 
defendant knows or someone who will receive less prison time or immunity for 
helping the government,216 and then gives the informant instructions on what he or 
she is to accomplish.  The acts of the informant, just as the acts of undercover agents, 
should be attributed to the government through normal agency principles.  The 
                                                                
211See United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1438 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated, United 
States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1986).  
212State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 
28, 1986). 
213Tarlow, supra note 3, at 38.  See also United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 
1978) (though unsuccessful, defendant presented entrapment defense to jury where informer 
emotionally and sexually seduced him).  
214Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172. 
215See U.S. CONST. amend. IV, V, & XIV.  
216Mark H. Moore, Invisible Offenses:  A Challenge to Minimally Intrusive Law 
Enforcement, in ABSCAM ETHICS:  MORAL ISSUES AND DECEPTION IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 17, 
27 (1983). 
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government should be responsible for the actions of its agents, whether they are 
actual agents or informants.  However, one court has opined that they would be less 
sympathetic to the prosecution where an actual law enforcement agent engages in 
sex or sex-related conduct with a defendant, as opposed to an informer.217  In this 
case, United States v. Simpson, the FBI employed the services of an informant whom 
they knew was a prostitute, heroin user and a fugitive from Canadian authorities.218  
The defendant argued that his due process rights and constitutional right to privacy 
were violated because the FBI knew she was a prostitute, directed her to become 
close to him and continued to use her as an informant after they learned that the two 
were having sexual relations.219  The Ninth Circuit relied on a number of factors in 
determining that the government’s conduct did not violate the defendant’s due 
process rights.220 
The Ninth Circuit used the factor derived from the United States v. Bogart 
decision221 stating that outrageous government conduct only bars prosecution in 
cases where the law enforcement officials have been “brutal” or used “physical or 
psychological coercion” on the defendant.222  Relying on the decision in Rochin v. 
California to determine what kind of conduct was outrageous enough to qualify,223 
the Ninth Circuit decided that the use of an informant who became sexually intimate 
with the defendant was not analogous to the pumping of a defendant’s stomach to 
find illegal drugs.224  The court limited the outrageous conduct defense to physical or 
psychological abuse.  However, it can be argued that a phony sexual relationship is a 
type of physical or psychological abuse.225  The court also stated that an informant 
must enjoy a great deal of latitude in making and deciding how to establish rapport 
with the suspect, and that it would be impossible to identify a fixed point at which a 
causal relationship turned into something more “‘shocking.’”226  Courts worry about 
drawing upon their personal notions of “human sexuality and social mores;”227 
however, they have previously used personal notions of morality in their decisions, 
and this type of case would prove no different.  Informants do enjoy an enormous 
amount of flexibility during undercover operations; however, when an informant 
engages in sexual relations, the line has been crossed and the conduct should be 
declared outrageous.   
                                                                
217United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462, 1468 n.4 (9th Cir. 1987).  
218Id. at 1464. 
219Id. at 1465. 
220Id. at 1465-69. 
221783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir. 1986).  
222Id. at 1435.  
223342 U.S. 165 (1952).  
224Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1465-66. 
225See supra notes 117-57 and accompanying text.  
226Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466. 
227Id.  
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The Simpson court additionally decided that the FBI was not responsible for the 
informant’s sexual conduct with the defendant.  The court found “the government’s 
passive tolerance here of a private informant’s questionable conduct to be less 
egregious than the conscious direction of government agents typically present in 
outrageous conduct challenges.”228  At some point, though, the FBI had to become 
aware of the informant’s sexual involvement with the defendant.  The government 
just chose to look the other way and not compromise the investigation in progress.  
The decisions of the FBI and this court are reprehensible and morally offensive.  As 
noted above, according to agency principles the acts of the informant should be 
imputed to the FBI leading to the conclusion that the FBI is responsible for the acts 
of its informants.  Nonetheless, the court failed to classify the conduct as outrageous 
and also noted that it need not decide whether the use of sex by an actual agent 
would shock the conscience.229  However, other circuits would be given the 
opportunity to address that question. 
The Second Circuit was given a chance to decide whether the use of sex by an 
undercover agent constituted outrageous conduct.230  In United States v. Cuervelo, 
the defendant was a subject of a government operation designed to ferret out a drug 
conspiracy.231  An undercover agent conducting the investigation testified that he 
tried to establish a “‘love interest’” with the defendant, and according to the 
defendant they had sexual relations on at least fifteen occasions.232  Additionally, the 
agent allegedly gave the defendant gifts of money, clothes, jewelry and numerous 
love letters to convince her to take part in a major drug sale.233  Based on its review 
of Simpson, the court developed three criteria that the defendant must show in order 
to make out a successful outrageous conduct claim:   
1) that the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its 
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own 
purposes upon learning that such a relationship existed;  
2) that the government agent initiated a sexual relationship, or allowed it 
to continue to exist, to achieve governmental ends; and  
3) that the sexual relationship took place during or close to the period 
covered by the indictment and was entwined with the events charged 
therein.234   
                                                                
228Id. at 1468.   
229Id. at 1468 n.4. 
230United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991). 
231Id. at 561.   
232Id. at 561-63. 
233Id. at 563. 
234Id. at 567.  See also United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998).  
“[T]here is little doubt that Cuervelo envisioned these criteria as the standard to be applied on 
the merits since the court noted that, at the merits stage, the district court would have to 
consider the following questions (which essentially address the same issues).” 
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Ultimately, the court remanded the case back to the district court for an evidentiary 
hearing because certain facts had not been adequately discovered.235 
The establishment of these factors was at least an attempt by a federal court to 
determine some type of concrete standard by which to judge sexual misconduct by a 
government agent/informant.  The problem with these factors is that they allow some 
leeway for government agents/informants to use sex and not be punished.  What if 
the sexual relations occurred before the investigation took place or towards the end 
of the investigation?  What if the government always insisted that it did not know 
about the relationship that was taking place at the time of the investigation?  With 
questions like these, the government and the courts are sure to avoid having to find 
sexual misconduct by agents/informants outrageous enough to warrant use of the due 
process defense.  Therefore, these types of sexual investigative techniques must be 
outlawed totally in order to avoid the government using excuses for this type of 
behavior. 
In United States v. Nolan-Cooper,236 the court used the factors in Cuervelo and 
decided that outrageous government conduct was not present in this case.  In Nolan-
Cooper, the defendant became a target of the IRS when the government obtained 
information that she was involved in the laundering of illegal drug proceeds.237  The 
government set up an investigation using an undercover agent who posed as a drug 
dealer, and the defendant readily accepted the chance to launder money for the 
agent.238  However, during the course of the thirteen-month investigation, the 
relationship between the agent and the defendant became socially close, and on one 
occasion, sexual.239  The agent gave the defendant gifts, “wined and dined” her and 
invited her to his plush hotels; additionally, another agent accompanied him one 
night and had sex with one of the defendant’s friends.240  Cuervelo241 was used as the 
focus of the court’s opinion.   
                                                          
(a) To what extent is the undercover agent’s conduct attributable to the 
government (i.e. did the government actively or passively acknowledge or 
encourage the sexual relationship)? 
(b) What purpose(s) did the agent’s sexual conduct serve, if any?  
(c) Did the agent act on his own initiative or under the direction (or with the 
approval) of his agency? 
(d) Who initiated the relationship? 
(e) When did the alleged sexual relations end? 
Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 232-33 (quoting Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 568).  
235Cuervelo, 949 F.2d at 569.  “On remand, the district court should make findings of fact 
regarding the conduct alleged by [defendant] and based upon what those findings are, if 
indicated, should proceed to determine whether the government engaged in conduct that was 
sufficiently outrageous to constitute a violation of [defendant’s] constitutional rights.”  Id. 
236155 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 1998).  
237Id. at 224.  
238Id.  
239Id. 
240Id. at 226-27.  
241949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991).  
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The court examined the factors developed in Cuervelo,242 and adopted that 
standard with one modification as the law of the Third Circuit.  The court recognized 
that the guidelines in Cuervelo required that the defendant introduce evidence 
demonstrating that the government knew its undercover agent had engaged or was 
engaging in sexual conduct with him/her.243  The court decided that this standard was 
too strict and would encourage the government to “turn a blind eye” to the actions of 
their agents.244  Hence, the court changed the standard to only requiring that the 
defendant show “the government consciously set out to use sex as a weapon in its 
investigatory arsenal, or acquiesced in such conduct for its own purposes once it 
knew or should have known that such a relationship existed.”245  Using this 
formulation, in addition with the other two factors in Cuervelo, the court concluded 
there was no evidence of any “‘nexus or connection’” between the sexual conduct 
and the investigation,246 and that this “… one instance of sexual misconduct alone 
does not give rise to a due process violation within the extremely narrow confines of 
the outrageous government conduct doctrine.”247  The fact that the sexual misconduct 
occurred within a month before the investigation was completed, and after the agent 
had gathered the necessary evidence, was also important to the court.248 
The fact that the agent did not set out to use sex as a weapon, or that the sexual 
misconduct only occurred once, should not make a difference in the analysis.  The 
agent still engaged in sexual misconduct during the investigation, and used romance 
and seduction throughout the investigation that led up to the gathering of information 
and the sexual encounter.  Although the court believed that these facts (that the agent 
did not set out to use sex as a weapon and the sexual misconduct occurred only once) 
made a difference, the judge did take into account other facts during the sentencing 
of the defendant.  The judge decided to depart downward from the federal sentencing 
guidelines due to the circumstances.  The judge thought that the defendant performed 
a public service for the government by “… ‘ferreting’ out sexual misconduct in one 
of its agents.”249  Notwithstanding the departure in sentencing, the defendant was still 
physically and emotionally affected by the misconduct of the agent.  Although the 
sex acts did not seem to be directly related to the criminality of the defendant, “they 
were part of the façade created by the government agent and as such the agent was 
acting as the government.”250  
                                                                
242See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
243Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 233.  
244Id.  
245Id. 
246Id. at 234. 
247Id.  
248Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 234-35. 
249Shannon P. Duffy, For Lawyer Seduced By Government Agent, Sentence Reduced By 
Federal Judge, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Feb. 17, 1999, at 1. 
250Id.  The façade included dinners, nightclubbing, expensive hotels and other socializing.  
The agent spent more than $50,000.00 in connection with this investigation.  Shannon P. 
Duffy, Due Process Was Not Violated When Investigator Had Sex With Target, But 
Resentencing Ordered, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 3, 1998, at 1. 
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The single incident of sex should be viewed as a total picture of using romance to 
further the investigation.  There was a “bodily intrusion” of the government into this 
defendant’s body, and as such, “the defendant did not agree to have sex with the 
United States government.”251  As was noted above, sex and intimacy require privacy 
and cause one to become vulnerable.252  Human beings need to be informed about the 
people with whom they become intimate; they need to know relevant characteristics 
about the person and the situation.253  To destroy these private realms of intimacy and 
love is the moral equivalent to torture with the capacity to destroy all aspects of 
honesty and good.254  It is in this regard that the use of sex and seduction in 
undercover investigations “… is the moral equivalent of rape because they both deny 
the dignity and freedom of the individual.”255 
Other federal courts have dealt similarly with sexual misconduct by a 
government agent or informant by finding that the sexual conduct which occurred 
was neither outrageous nor violative of due process or privacy rights.256  The only 
court that has actually reversed a conviction due to sexual misconduct by a 
government agent is the United States Court of Military Appeals.257  In that case, 
agents of the Air Force Office of Special Investigation targeted the defendant who 
had just become a member of the Air Force.258  The defendant was emotionally 
unstable, an alcoholic and her husband and children had just recently left her.259  The 
agents used an informant who was a Staff Sergeant at the base where the defendant 
was located, and this informant engaged in adulterous and sodomous behavior with 
                                                                
251Duffy, supra note 249, at 1. 
252See supra text accompanying notes 117-57. 
253See supra text accompanying notes 132-37.  
254See supra text accompanying notes 128-29.  
255Marx, supra note 199, at 14.  
256See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 891 F.2d 1265, 1267-69 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting 
outrageous government conduct defense even though government employed cocaine addict 
and previous sexual partner of defendant as informant); United States v. Restrepo, 930 F.2d 
705, 707 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense when the 
government employed one of the defendant’s previous sexual partners); United States v. 
Fadel, 844 F.2d 1425, 1427-34 (10th Cir. 1988) (rejecting outrageous government conduct 
defense, but remanding the case for an issue of entrapment, when the government employed a 
long time friend of the defendant as an informant who engaged in sexual conduct with the 
defendant throughout the investigation); United States v. Cole, 807 F.2d 262, 265-66 (1st Cir. 
1986) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense when the investigating officer 
obtained incriminating information while carrying on an affair with the defendant’s live-in 
companion); United States v. Shoffner, 826 F.2d 619, 626 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting 
outrageous government conduct defense when informant used sexual and family relationships 
to obtain information and when government paid for an abortion arising from the informant’s 
sexual relationship with the defendant); United States v. Prairie, 572 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 
1978) (rejecting outrageous government conduct defense because the informant’s sexual 
relationship with the defendant was not carried on at the request of the government agents).  
257United States v. Lemaster, 40 M.J. 178 (C.M.A. 1994). 
258Id. at 179. 
259Id.  
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the defendant in order to entice her to possess cocaine.260  However, the decision was 
not outwardly based on the outrageous government conduct defense.  Instead the 
court held that the targeting of the defendant in this case constituted improper 
inducement of a servicemember, and at a minimum it violated the fundamental 
norms of military due process and was the equivalent to entrapment.261  The court did 
mention that the defendant was predisposed, and that it was unreasonable for an 
agent to induce an emotionally unstable alcoholic to participate in crimes and then 
arrest her because she was unable to resist his love and affection.262 
Military courts do not act as precedents for other federal courts; nevertheless, it is 
useful to analyze the decision to determine what the court really meant in its opinion.  
Because the court admitted that the defendant was predisposed, the entrapment 
defense is unavailable to her.  The outrageous government conduct defense is the 
only defense left, and the court does say that the conduct of the agent was 
reprehensible and violative of military due process.263  Perhaps this case should act as 
a guide for other federal courts in their dealings with sexual misconduct by 
government agents.  The use of sexual misconduct should be declared reprehensible, 
morally offensive and outrageous.  Sexual misconduct should not be tolerated during 
undercover investigations; hence, once it has been determined that sexual 
misconduct occurred, the outrageous government conduct defense should apply. 
B.  State Cases 
The state courts seem to take “… a less forgiving approach to law enforcement 
agents, including confidential informers straying into forbidden sexual territory.”264  
However, most state court decisions are not directly on point.  In a Florida case,265 a 
confidential informant who knew the defendant previously, re-established her 
connections and asked him on several occasions to get her cocaine.266  When he told 
her that he had stopped using drugs, she started kissing him and telling him that they 
could “fool around and party” if he would just get her some drugs.267  The informant 
later admitted that the police officers told her “… to push it because they were sure 
that I could take him into it.”268  The court noted that “… sex involves physical and 
psychological desires so strong as to readily foster fantasies and to anesthetize or 
supplant normal rational reasoning and will.”269  The court concluded that the 
                                                                
260Id. at 180.   
261Id. at 181.  “Esprit de corps, good order and discipline, and high morale are not, in any 
way enhanced or maintained by this type of police work.”  Lemaster, 40 M.J. at 181. 
262Id. at 180-81.  
263See supra note 256 and accompanying text.  
264Tarlow, supra note 3, at 39.   
265State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 
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29Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
822 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:833 
defendant had been entrapped by the talk of sex, and was induced into committing a 
crime that he would not otherwise commit.270  Even though the defendant used 
entrapment here instead of the outrageous conduct defense, the court still based its 
conclusion on the fact that sex is too strong and effective an inducement to be used 
as bait.  Actual sexual relations had not even occurred, and the court still found that 
the defendant was induced into committing the crime.   
Similarly, in People v. Martinez,271 California seemed to be focused on the 
intensity of the sexual talk and insinuations.  An attractive, young female undercover 
agent, posing as an unemployed Las Vegas card dealer, was introduced to the 
defendant.272  The agent acted the part of a “loose woman” who might trade sexual 
favors for narcotics.273  Even though this conduct may seem relatively tame 
compared to that discussed above, the court concluded that the conduct “... falls far 
short of an acceptable standard of police conduct and constitutes entrapment.”274  
Once again, the court used the entrapment defense and not the outrageous 
government conduct defense.  If the defendant is found not to be predisposed, then 
the entrapment defense is applicable.  However, if the defendant is predisposed to 
committing the crime, the outrageous government conduct defense is appropriate, 
and the analysis should proceed according to due process principles.  One could 
argue that the appropriate solution would be to eliminate the requirement of 
predisposition with the entrapment defense.  However, the outrageous government 
conduct defense is a separate defense based on constitutional principles, and is also 
needed to combat over-reaching government behavior that entrapment cannot stop.  
Entrapment has been widely used and known to be applicable when the defendant 
had no predisposition to commit the crime.  It would be foolish to eliminate one 
defense and change entrapment to encompass the outrageous government conduct 
defense.  Two separate defenses are needed in order to deal with misconduct by the 
government.  The two defenses address evils in different situations, and the 
outrageous government conduct defense can be specifically tailored to combat sexual 
misconduct of the government even when the entrapment defense is unavailable. 
The state of Washington has found outrageous government conduct when sexual 
misconduct is engaged in by a government agent/informant.275  In this case, a 
government informant engaged in a sexual relationship with an alcoholic defendant 
                                                                
270Banks, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *3.  “Accordingly, where sex is involved as the 
inducement … the case does not depend on the subtlety of the sexual suggestion, who initiated 
it, … or the strength of the logical inductive reasoning process that causes a defendant to 
believe there is an implication of future sexual favors …”  Id.  
271203 Cal. Rptr. 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). 
272Id. at 839. 
273Id.   
274Id.  See also People v. Hillary, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 415, 419-21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) 
(where undercover agent offered highly alluring sexual pleasures in exchange for narcotics, 
the court found sufficient evidence for entrapment).  “Police inducements which play on 
‘base’ emotions are no less reprehensible than those which appeal to more altruistic feelings.”  
Id. at 419. 
275Washington v. Lively, 921 P.2d 1035 (Wash. 1996).   
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and even proposed marriage in an effort to persuade the defendant to sell cocaine.276  
Even though the informant denied having any sexual relations with the defendant, 
the court found that “… the emotional reliance of the [d]efendant on the informant 
was an integral part of the informant’s control,”277 and this type of conduct was 
sufficient for a defense of outrageous government conduct.278  This case recognizes 
the intensity of emotions that accompany sexual conduct and romantic intimacy.  
Sexual conduct becomes an unfair investigative technique and surpasses the limits of 
any type of decency. 
Ohio’s view of governmental sexual misconduct seems to be parallel to that of 
the federal cases discussed above.  In an unpublished decision, an Ohio appellate 
court did not find the use of sex by a government informant to be outrageous 
conduct.279  In this case, the informant eventually persuaded the defendant to sell 
drugs by saying that she needed the money for her children.280  Additionally, she 
engaged in sexual intercourse with the defendant, “…thereby greatly endearing 
herself to him and making his refusal to sell her drugs extremely difficult, if not 
impossible.”281  Nonetheless, the court commented that even though it may look with 
disdain on the informant’s use of sexuality to influence the defendant, the sexual 
activity with the defendant had ceased well before the sale of the drugs.282  As was 
noted above, just because the sexual activity was not occurring at the exact time of 
the offense does not mean that it did not influence and persuade the defendant to 
commit the crime.  Some actions are taken in response to what others have said or 
done; sex is no different.  In fact, it is even more powerful than other types of 
persuasion or inducements.283  The use of sex influences people to act a certain way.  
Additionally, when people are intimately involved, they do not want to disappoint 
their partners and will usually succumb to what they are asked to accomplish.  For 
that reason, when the government engages in sexual misconduct with a person who 
is under investigation, it may be extremely difficult for that person to resist the 
temptations and say no to the request.  On the other hand, even when sex is a part of 
the crime to be investigated, deception is still involved when the agent/informant 
takes it upon himself/herself to become too engrossed in the investigation. 
Arguments have been made concluding that the use of sex in the enforcement of 
laws requiring sexual conduct (specifically prostitution) can be justified.284  Most 
                                                                
276Id. at 1038-39.  
277Id. at 1047.  
278Id. at 1049.  
279Ohio v. Doran, No. 1965, 1984 WL 5130, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6, 1984) 
(unpublished).  
280Id. at *1.  
281Id. 
282Id. at *3.  
283State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 
28, 1986).  
284Marx, supra note 199, at 16. 
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state courts have taken this approach.285  Although prostitution usually involves only 
sexual intimacy and not emotional closeness, there is a difference when deception is 
used.286  In this sense sexual acts are “personal” even in the absence of psychological 
intimacy, and betrayal of another’s body is extremely violative.287  Additionally, 
prostitution is a relatively minor misdemeanor charge, and to spend so much time 
and money on the investigation does not seem right.  Courts have found that at times, 
unorthodox investigatory methods are necessary to obtain certain types of criminals.  
This statement may be true; yet, it is not right to specifically instruct an agent or 
informant to engage in sexual activity if necessary to obtain evidence.288  If the 
undercover agent must solicit a prostitute in order to obtain evidence or make an 
arrest, the arrest should be made before any type of sexual activity occurs.  If the 
prostitute agrees to perform services, this agreement is enough to make an arrest.  
The conduct does not need to proceed any further.  If the conduct does proceed 
further than the agreement to engage in sexual relations, then the agent/informant has 
crossed the line and the conduct should be declared outrageous.   
VI.  A SOLUTION 
Since the courts have not specifically defined what constitutes outrageous 
government conduct that “shocks the conscience,”289 and because all cases must be 
decided on their own facts to determine whether a defendant’s due process rights 
have been violated, a standard of uniformity will never be reached.  In addition, 
cases involving sexual misconduct by government agents/informants have even less 
of a chance of reaching uniformity based on the current federal and state case law.290  
Without any solid standard on which to base instances of governmental sexual 
misconduct, the limits of decency and morality are surpassed without a chance of 
return.  Courts have found that one sexual episode is not enough to constitute 
                                                                
285See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 462 N.E.2d 948 (Ill. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting outrageous 
government conduct when undercover agents engaged in acts of prostitution to catch the 
defendant with drugs); Anchorage v. Flanagan, 649 P.2d 957 (Ala. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting 
outrageous government conduct when a police officer permitted the defendant to engage in 
sexual contact with him); State v. Emerson, 517 P.2d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973) (rejecting 
outrageous government conduct when an undercover agent engaged in sexual intercourse five 
times with five different women); State v. Jessup, 641 P.2d 1185 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) 
(rejecting outrageous government conduct when police informant participated in acts of 
prostitution for over three weeks). 
286Marx, supra note 199, at 16. 
287Id. 
288See, e.g., State v. Tookes, 699 P.2d 983 (Haw. 1985) (rejecting outrageous government 
conduct where civilian agent was specifically instructed to engage in sexual intercourse if 
necessary to obtain evidence sufficient for a conviction); State v. Putnam, 639 P.2d 858 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (rejecting outrageous government conduct where undercover civilian 
agent was told to do what was necessary to gather evidence of prostitution, and specifically 
authorized her to “turn tricks”).  
289Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.  
290See supra notes 208-83 and accompanying text.   
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outrageous behavior,291 and that sexual relations that occurred too long before or 
after the important information was gathered do not violate due process or privacy 
rights.292  Courts have also reasoned that when the government is found not to have 
known about the sexual conduct, outrageous conduct does not exist.293 
Taking into account how sex is perceived in today’s world, along with agency 
principles, this reasoning is flawed.  Furthermore, if one sexual misconduct episode 
is allowed, then further along down the road two, three or even more episodes will be 
allowed.  The government will continue to argue that it knew nothing about the 
sexual encounters, that it in no way encouraged them to occur, and that the sexual 
relations had nothing to do with the investigation.  This common slippery slope 
argument fits perfectly into this problem.  Who is going to draw the line between 
permissible government sexual misconduct and impermissible conduct?  The courts 
cannot even agree on what outrageous government conduct actually looks like.  The 
only way to solve this problem is to develop a uniform rule that the courts must 
adopt when determining whether the government’s use of sexual conduct was 
outrageous and violative of due process and privacy rights.   
Because no possible way exists to draw a line between permissible and 
impermissible sexual misconduct by the government, the only solution is to forbid all 
types of sexual activity by the government throughout the entire investigation.  This 
solution does not mean that the use of deception or other clever tactics may not be 
used.  What it means is that if and when romantic intimacy or sexual conduct occurs, 
the outrageous government conduct defense is satisfied.  The Constitution leaves it to 
the political branches of government to decide whether to regulate law enforcement 
conduct which may “… offend some fastidious squeamishness or private 
sentimentalism about combating crime too energetically.”294  The federal and state 
legislatures should pass laws forbidding any type of sexual or intense romantic 
conduct to be used by the government in undercover investigations.  The law should 
be written into all law enforcement codes of ethics and behavior guides so that the 
agents are aware of what type of conduct they cannot use in investigating crimes.  
All government informants must be made aware of the law and the penalties for 
disobeying it.  If a government agent/informant engages in this type of newly 
forbidden behavior, the indictment against the defendant must be dismissed or if the 
defendant has already been convicted, the conviction must be reversed.  
Additionally, the government may choose to have the agent suspended or even 
terminated, and the guilty informant may never be used again in a law enforcement 
investigation.   
                                                                
291See, e.g., United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3rd Cir. 1998) (finding that 
only one incident of sexual intercourse did not constitute outrageous conduct). 
292See, e.g., Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (finding that the only incident of sexual 
intercourse occurred within a month before the investigation was completed); United States v. 
Miller, 891 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that sexual relations occurred too soon before 
the actual investigation had begun).  
293See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 813 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that the use 
of sex in the investigation was not attributable to the government); United States v. Prairie, 
572 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that the sexual conduct was not carried out as a request 
from the government).  
294Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172.  
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Because people need to assume a level of good faith and trust in intimate 
relations, and because privacy is an essential constitutional right,295 this type of law is 
the only one that makes sense.  Even if the defendant was predisposed to committing 
the crime, it is not fair to allow law enforcement officials to use any type of means 
necessary to catch the defendant.  The use of sex and intimate romance is a technique 
that is so distasteful,296 its use should be prohibited.  Police activity must be regulated 
by something more than the law―it must respect the values of a community, and by 
forbidding this type of “intimate surveillance” this goal is accomplished.297  
Government cannot afford to ignore what is important to human beings (trusting and 
intimate relationships).  Abandonment of respect for such relationships “… will 
seriously diminish the worth of the social order to people.”298  Moreover, privacy has 
become an important constitutional right that has continuously been litigated, and the 
current trend leans toward ruling in favor of the individual’s privacy.  If the courts 
continue to recognize sex and intimacy as an appropriate investigative tool, then this 
recognition may actually serve as an incentive for sexual misconduct in the United 
States.  In order to promote morality and decency in the world, sexual misconduct by 
government agents/informants must be forbidden.  No other alternatives are 
available.   
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Government agents and informants must not be permitted to use any type of 
investigative tool necessary to gather important information from a defendant or to 
obtain a conviction.  By allowing law enforcement officials to engage in immoral 
and unethical conduct, society is given the impression that sex can be used and 
relationships exploited as long as the courts do not disagree.  The time has come to 
change this impression.  Courts have noted previously that by attempting to draw 
some kind of line as to what constitutes permissible or impermissible sexual 
behavior would require them to draw on their personal and private notions of human 
sexuality and social mores.299  However, courts have previously used their personal 
notions of sexuality and morality time and again.300  Moreover, the legislature would 
draw the line and pass the law regaining the abolition of all sexual conduct used by 
the government in undercover investigations.  The courts would merely apply the 
law to each set of facts that came before it. 
In a world that is so sexually advanced, we must not lose sight of our morals and 
all elements of governmental decency.  An outrageous government conduct defense 
should be successful whenever sexual or intense intimate relations occur between an 
undercover agent/informant and a defendant.  This type of conduct violates a 
                                                                
295See supra notes 117-57 and accompanying text. 
296KLEINIG, supra note 152, at 135.  
297Schoeman, supra note 126, at 158. 
298Id.  
299Simpson, 813 F.2d at 1466-67.  
300See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding state abortion statutes illegal); 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding the regulation of contraceptives 
illegal). 
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person’s fundamental due process and privacy rights and should not be tolerated.  
The only solution is to forbid this type of conduct regardless of the circumstances or 
the severity of the crime.  Some people argue that a need exists for flexibility and 
variety in law enforcement situations and that “categorical prohibition” is 
inappropriate.301  These people continue to opine that each case must be examined 
separately on the basis of its own facts.302  However, this solution is not morally or 
constitutionally acceptable.  Undercover agents/informants can be successful in 
using other types of deception in their investigations that are morally acceptable 
without engaging in sexual or romantic relationships.  If the government cannot 
catch a “criminal” with permissible and constitutionally proper methods, then that 
“criminal” should not be caught.  Sex is much too strong and effective an 
inducement to be used as bait.303  If this kind of conduct is permitted to persist, the 
constitutional rights of citizens will continue to be jeopardized. 
ANDREA B. DALOIA 
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303State v. Banks, No. 85-1715, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 11526, at *4 (Fla. Ct. App. Aug. 
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